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Creative insight (CI) has been extensively investigated in psychology and cognitive neuroscience,
which is defined as the process in which impasses the solver encountered are broken by
restructuring and then leads to a peculiar experience accompanying the sudden solution.
Numerous studies have greatly extended our knowledge concerning neurocognitive mechanism
of CI, and offered robust supports for brain-mind principle of CI (Sternberg and Davidson, 1995).
With the emergence of embodied approach (Gallagher, 2015), the relationship between body and
CI is a burgeoning issue that has been widely concerned. Here, we elaborated the theoretical
framework of triadic interaction of brain-mind-body (TIBMB) for CI, which would deepen our
understandings on mind-body relationship and the essence of CI.
THE INTERACTION OF BRAIN-MIND-BODY: THE FUNDAMENTAL
IDEA AND SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE
The TIBMB is rooted in the brain-mind principle in psychology and can be traced back to the
central issue of the relation between mind and body in philosophy (Gallagher, 2015). This theory
argues that CI can be achieved by the TIBMB and that CI also conversely exerts critical influences
on these three agents. Interfering with one of the three subsystems may also partly change the CI
process.
The term “mind” commonly refers to a collection of mental processes rather than a substance
or spirit (Fischbach, 1992), similar to the elements that are manifested when understanding
a joke, solving a difficult problem, or experiencing happiness. Of note, rather than being the
process of CI itself, the mind here refers to the psychological mechanisms underlying CI.
One of these mechanisms is restructuring (Ohlsson, 1984; Luo and Knoblich, 2007; Weisberg,
2015). According to representational change theory, CI is achieved by restructuring because
of the biased initial problem representation. Consequently, increasing studies demonstrate the
importance of restructuring in insight. For example, Öllinger et al. (2014) adopted three
versions of the nine-dot problem that can evoke different representations by removing particular
sources of difficulty from the standard problem, which demonstrated that three experimental
versions of the problem resulted in a higher solution rate than did the standard problem.
Representational restructuring/change remains necessary even when the “insight problem”
doesn’t involve any spatial structure change, such as brainteaser (Luo and Niki, 2003) or
riddles (Fleck and Braun, 2015). Durso et al. (1994) examined restructuring in CI by having
participants attempt to solve a riddle that involves a missing piece of information and
observed that less misdirected representation easily resulted in CI by shortening the distance
between the connections critical to restructuring. Additionally, studies on representational
change training also support this role of representational change or restructuring. Patrick
and Ahmed (2014), for example, documented that solution rates improved substantially
with restructuring training for three different categories of insight problems, and their
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facilitation rates were also similar. Other mental mechanisms
were also reported to manage insight (see Dietrich and Kanso,
2010); however, these mechanisms are all manifestations of the
mind in CI regardless of whether the specific mechanism is
representation restructuring.
Early psychologists separated the neural machinery
responsible for the mind—the brain (the head)—from the
body in the question of mind-body. In psychology, the mind
and the brain are two independent variables; however, the mind
is a complex phenomenon built on the physical scaffolding
of the brain (Libet, 2006), which is a complex, temporally
and spatially multi-scale structure that engenders molecular,
cellular, and neuronal phenomena that together constitute the
neurobiological basis of the mind (Bassett and Gazzaniga, 2011).
Consequently, the term brain in the TIBMB primarily refers to
the brain mechanisms of CI. In the past 20s years, the association
between the brain and the mind has been greatly expanded.
Many studies indicate that CI is related to the activations in a
network of brain regions such as the bilateral prefrontal cortex,
the anterior cingulated cortex, the bilateral temporal cortices,
the precuneus, the insula, the amygdala, the medial temporal
lobe, and the cerebellum (Shen et al., 2013). Although the precise
roles of those brain regions in insight have not been entirely
determined, substantial evidence across various levels reveals
the complexity of insight. These levels include brain lesion
investigations and neuroscience studies on healthy subjects using
electrophysiological/neuroimaging (see Dietrich and Kanso,
2010) or brain stimulation techniques (Cerruti and Schlaug,
2009; Wei et al., 2014). All of the studies have documented the
robust activations in those regions of insight across various tasks,
indicating that CI recruits a distributed network encompassing
many distant but highly connected brain regions rather than one
localized area or a few specific brain regions.
Another entity that may be related to the mind in the question
of mind-body is the body “below the head” (hereinafter, the
term body refers to the body below the head), which in the
human species generally comprises a neck, trunk, arms and
hands, legs and feet. Beginning in the late 1980s, however,
some scientists challenged the view that the body is merely an
input-output facility for the brain (Libet, 2006). These scientists
argued that instead, higher mental processes are grounded in
bodily experience and in the neural systems that govern the
body (Carpenter, 2011). The likely link between the body and
CI was not recognized until recently, with mounting evidence
(Grant and Spivey, 2003; Werner and Raab, 2014) that reveals
the embodiment of CI. By contrast to the view of the body
as an anchor or understructure of the head, increasingly more
studies (Lipnicki and Byrne, 2005; Thomas and Lleras, 2007,
2009a,b) have recently demonstrated that the body may play an
equal role, if not a more important role, than the brain in CI.
Accumulating evidence indicates that gesturing can hinder or
advance creative cognition (Garber and Goldin-Meadow, 2002),
with several findings that reliably document the influence of
body posture (Friedman and Förster, 2000), gestures (Lipnicki
and Byrne, 2005), or bodily movement (Thomas and Lleras,
2009a) on CI. Another line of evidence for this role of body in
CI is that attention guiding (Grant and Spivey, 2003; Thomas
and Lleras, 2007, 2009b) or flexible eye shifting (Fleck and
Braun, 2015) can facilitate insight. One common method of
manipulating attention is requiring participants to perform
a secondary task that can guide attentions or elicit various
attention patterns by presenting visual stimuli of this secondary
task in different display positions (Thomas and Lleras, 2009b).
Furthermore, the automatic system acts on cardiac muscles and
glands, carrying afferent signals from the vegetative organs to
the brain and spinal cord, which regulate what are loosely called
the body’s “innards.” Kinds of critical functions like breathing
are all controlled by this system (Bas¸ar, 2008). This effect of the
body on CI has been replicated by studies (e.g., Jausovec and
Bakracevic, 1995; Whitehurst et al., 2016) using physiological
measurements on skin conduction or cardiovascular responses
like heart rate variability. Overall, these lines of evidence indicate
the involvement of the body in insight.
Rather than the unidirectional view that the bodily experience
as a cause or a result of the insight, it seems more appropriate
to take the cycled view that the insight and bodily experience
both can be a cause or result of each other. If the bodily
response seems to be organized and regular, or in a unchanging
status that can promote self-reflective thought, this response
is likely an antecedent of the insight; By contrast, if the
bodily experience is less organized or only peripheroneural
responses like cardiovascular activity, such experience may be
a consequence of the insight. Specifically, the solvers’ bodily
experience of a swinging is likely an antecedent of an insight to
the two-string problem (e.g., Thomas and Lleras, 2009a), which
may lead to new bodily responses as a result of this insight, e.g., an
increasing heart rate accompanying insight solutions (Jausovec
and Bakracevic, 1995). This cycled view stresses the importance
of pre-insight bodily experience/status in the insight.
Although the three key elements in the TIBMB have
been discussed separately, these elements are not independent
influences and generally function as an interactive system
because cognitive processes are grounded in bodily experience
and in the central neural systems that govern the body
(Carpenter, 2011). One example of the interaction of mind
and body is that individuals use their bodies to think and
that cognitive processes can also result from the manner in
which our bodies interact with our immediate surroundings and
how “directed actions can guide thought” (Thomas and Lleras,
2009a,b). In addition, some evolutionary evidence implies the
interaction of mind and body (Carpenter, 2011). In fact, the
brain can be understood as a complex system that is responsible
for processes or that modulates the functions of the body. The
brain also modulates the cardiac muscles and glands that carry
signals from the vegetative organs to the brain and spinal cord
(Bas¸ar, 2008), in whichmental states emerge from interactions on
multiple physical and functional levels (Bassett and Gazzaniga,
2011). Meditation, for example, is known to be one method of
integrative body-mind training that can improve CI performance
(Ding et al., 2015) and that can be linked to the interaction of
the central and autonomic nervous systems (Tang et al., 2009),
and activity in the default mode network and brain connectivity
(Brewer et al., 2011), supporting the TIBMB for CI. Additional
support comes from Shen (2014), in which the insight experience,
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known to be one defining characteristic of CI (Shen et al., 2016),
was revealed to be associated with the triadic interaction of
brain-mind-body.
Importantly, the bodily experience should not be only
regarded as a proxy of the brain. Although the bodily experience
seems difficult to be entirely free of the brain due to the function
of central nervous system, reliable evidence was documented that
not all bodily responses were generated by these neural activities.
In some situations, the bodily experience can still appear even if
its corresponding central nervous system is inactive or damaged
(see Bechara and Damasio, 2005), implicating the necessity of
placing the body in the same position of the brain within the
TIBMB. Given that similar interaction frameworks or the brain-
mind-body agents might involve in some non-creative/non-
insightful cognition, the specificity of the triadic interaction
of them in CI should be addressed, which remains open as
this field is emerging. Nonetheless, not all cognition involves
the body (Irwin, 2000) and the brain and mind agents of the
TIBMB are specific to CI, referring to the insight-related brain
or psychological mechanisms rather than the brain or mind
itself in a broader sense, suggesting the agents are specific
to CI.
THE NECESSITY OF SEPARATING THE
BRAIN FROM THE ENTIRE BODY
In the traditional view of the mind-body relation, the brain
is not separated from but is an essential component of the
body (Skinner, 1990) because the brain is incorporated into
the body and is essential for the consciousness or the mind.
However, mounting evidence has revealed that the brain is the
most important substrate of psychological processes. The special
significance of the brain renders it necessary for the brain to
isolate itself from the entire body, resulting in “the head” and
“the body below the head.” The brain-body separation not only
stresses the importance of the brain in mind or consciousness
but is also helpful in illustrating the relation between the
central and automatic nervous systems and their specific
functions in psychological processes and some physiological
phenomena. This isolation is conducive to determining precise
neural correlates of types of psychological processes and
facilitating CI in a variety of situations and relevant health
promotion programs. With increasing interest in embodied
cognition, such separation can benefit identifying the role of
body components in different psychobiological/biopsychological
activities and also manifest the zeitgeist of the embodied
approach. Additionally, some neuroscientists have planned to
conduct human head transplant experiments involving the brain-
body separation (Osborne, 2016). From this perspective, the
TIBMB can be considered as a theoretical response to such
separation and may offer some implications into one’s post-
surgery behavioral/psychological change.
Collectively, we believe that the TIBMB likely play critical
roles in triggering CI and studying insight experience is a key
avenue validating the framework TIBMB in insight.
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